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NOTES
SPEED LAWS AND BURDENS OF PROOF
In using its power to promote public safety, the California Legislature has
enacted statutes restricting the speed of vehicles using the streets, roads, and
highways. These statutes impose upon the California driver three speed limit
rules: a maximum speed limit,' prima facie speed limits, 2 and a basic speed
law.3 The subject of this inquiry is the requirements these speed rules impose
on the driver and the burdens of proof these speed rules require in civil and
criminal trials.
Three Speed Laws
On January 1, 1960 a maximum speed limit of 65 miles per hour became
effective. 4 This speed limit sets an absolute speed on all vehicles, although cer-
tain types of vehicles may be restricted to a lower speed limit.5
The prima facie speed limits are determined by the nature of the area through
1 CAL. VER. CODE § 22349: "Maximum Speed Limit. No person shall drive a vehicle upon
a highway at a speed greater than 65 miles per hour."
SCAI. VE . CODE § 22352: "Prima Facie Speed Limit. The prima facie limits are as
follows and the same shall be applicable unless changed as authorized in this code and, if so
changed, only when signs have been erected giving notice thereof:
(a) Fifteen miles per hour:
When traversing a railway grade crossing, if during the last 100 feet of the approach to
the crossing the driver does not have a clear and unobstructed view of the crossing and of
any traffic on the railway for a distance of 400 feet in both directions along such railway.
This subdivision does not apply in the case of any railway grade crossing where human
flagman is on duty or a clearly visible electrical or mechanical railway crossing signal device
is installed but does not then indicate the immediate approach of a railway train or car.
When traversing any intersection of highway if during the last 100 feet of his approach
to the intersection the driver does not have a clear and unobstructed view of the intersection
and of any traffic upon all of the highways entering the intersection for a distance of 100 feet
along all such highways, except at an intersection protected by stop signs, or yield right-of-
way signs, or controlled by official traffic control signals.
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour:
On any highway other than a state highway, in any business or residence district unless
a different speed is determined by local authority under procedures set forth in this code.
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof, contiguous to the highway while
children are going to or leaving such school during opening or closing hours or during the
noon recess period. Such prima facie limit shall also apply when passing any other school
grounds which are not separated from the highway by a fence, gate or other physical barrier
while the grounds are in use by children."
' CAL. VEEs. CODE § 22350: "Basic Speed Law. No person shall drive a vehicle upon a
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for the traffic on,
and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the
safety of persons or property."
' CA. VEI. CODE § 22349.
5 CAL. VEn. CoDE §§ 22406,22408,22414,22412.
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which a street passes. The usual areas in which these limits are applicable are
residential and business districts, blind intersections, obstructed railroad cross-
ings, and school buildings and grounds during school hours.6
Prior to 1959, if the area was not posted with a sign designating the prima
facie speed limit, the highway speed limit was applicable.7 This posting require-
ment was deleted when the California vehicle code was revised in 1959.8 In
Beard v. David9 the court stated that the posting of signs is not necessary, and
whether the area was one in which a prima facie speed limit was applicable is
to be shown by proof of facts as to the nature of the area. For instance, for a
business district the criterion is that for 600 feet 50 percent or more of the
property fronting on the street is occupied by buildings used for business; 10
for a residential district that one side of the street has 13 or more separate
dwellings within one-quarter of a mile fronting the street."
Local authorities may by ordinance determine and declare prima facie speed
limits less than the 65 mile per hour maximum and they may range from 25
to 60 miles per hour.' 2 These speed variations are effective when appropriate
signs are erected upon the street.1 3 This posting requirement applies only when
local authorities have set prima facie limits other than as required by statute.
Thus, in addition to observing the maximum speed limit, the California
driver must observe the prima facie speed limit of less than the maximum when
it is applicable. 4 These prima facie speed limits apply to all vehicles. 15
The basic speed law is a codification of the common law. It has been
attacked as being invalid for indefiniteness, but has nevertheless been held to
be constitutional.
16
It is a general principle of California law that the operator of a vehicle may
not escape liability by saying that he was not exceeding the speed limit estab-
lished by statute or ordinance.' 7 The basic speed law can be violated regardless
of the posted prima facie speed law since it is governed by a different objective
standard-what is reasonable and proper under the circumstances. There have
been a great many California decisions in which the speed was considered
excessive even though the driver was driving at a speed less than the maximum
or the prima facie speed limit.' 8 Thus, the maximum speed limit does not
CAL. VEa. CODE § 22352.
Clark v. Pamplin, 147 Cal. App. 2d 676, 305 P.2d 950 (1957).
' Cal. Stat. 1959, c. 3. p. 1691. deleted the words "in which event the speed designated on
the sign shall be the prima facie limit."
179 Cal. App. 2d 175, 3 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1960).
10 CAL. VEH. CODE § 235.
t' CAL. VEH. CODE § 515.
't CAL. VEH. CODE § 22358.
't CAL. VEt. CODE § 22358.
"Fortier Trans. Co. v. Union Packing Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 748, 216 P.2d 470 (1950).
Ibid.
16 Ex Parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172 (1920) ; People v.
DeCasaus, 150 Cal. App. 2d 274, 309 P.2d 835 (1957).
" Opitz v. Schenck, 178 Cal. 636, 174 Pac. 40 (1918).
" Reaugh v. Cudahy Packing Co., 189 Cal. 335, 208 Pac. 125 (1922) ; Opitz v. Schenck,
178 Cal. 636, 174 Pac. 40 (1918) ; Graf v. Garcia, 117 Cal. App. 2d 792, 256 P.2d 995 (1953);
Grasso v. Cunial, 106 Cal. App. 2d 294, 235 P.2d 32 (1951).
[Vol. 14THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
constitute permission to drive an automobile at the maximum speed limit under
all circumstances.' 9
The terms "reasonable" and "proper" refer to the speed of the vehicle
and not the manner of driving.20 In a criminal action an appellate court said
that the complaint was faulty as it alleged, as a violation of the basic speed law,
the manner of driving rather than driving at a speed which endangered the
safety of persons or property.2 ' In People v. Cole,22 the court stated that
mere speed constitutes a violation of the basic speed law, and the absence of
an accident is immaterial.
The basic speed law requires the exercise of judgment on the part of the
driver. The driver is bound to know the conditions which dictate the speed at
which he can drive with a reasonable degree of safety. These conditions are:
the driver's car, his ability to handle that car, and knowledge of his ability
to come to a stop at different speeds and under different highway conditions.23
Burden of Proof in Civil Trial
In a civil action, the maximum speed statute presents little trouble. All that
is required to prove negligence is the fact that the defendant exceeded that limit.
In cases where trucks have exceeded the maximum limit applicable to such
vehicles, California courts have held the excessive speed itself constituted
negligence per se.24 In Lewis v. Franklin,25 the court stated that if the jury
believed that the defendant was exceeding the maximum speed limit, then the
defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and it was error to instruct
otherwise.
The prima facie limit presents more of a problem to the plaintiff in a civil
action. The fact that the defendant has exceeded a prima facie speed limit
does not constitute negligence per se.26 It is necessary for the plaintiff to estab-
lish, as a fact, that the operation of the vehicle at a speed exceeding the
applicable prima facie limit was unreasonable and improper under the circum-
stances.2 7 This burden is placed on the plaintiff by statute.28  This statute
applies only to prima facie speed limits and not to the maximum speed limit.
Whenever a plaintiff alleges that the defendant exceeded the basic speed
law, he is directly alleging that the defendant was negligent. The plaintiff must
" Walters v. Du Four, 132 Cal. App. 72,22 P.2d 259 (1933).
" People v. Banat, 39 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 765, 100 P.2d 374 (App. Dept., Super. Ct., Los
Angeles 1940).
-Ibid.
"124 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 904, 269 P.2d 247 (App. Dept., Super Ct., San Bernardino,
1954).
"Wilding v. Norton, 156 Cal. App. 2d 374, 319 P.2d 440 (1957).
"Lewis v. Franklin, 161 Cal. App. 2d 177, 326 P.2d 625 (1958) ; Fortier Trans. Co. v.
Union Packing Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 748, 216 P.2d 470 (1950); Wood v. Moore, 64 Cal.
App. 2d 144,148 P.2d 91 (1944).
"161 Cal. App. 2d 177, 326 P.2d 625 (1958).
Miller v. Northwestern Pacific R.R., 206 Cal. App. 2d - , 24 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1962);
Williams v. Cole, 181 Cal. App. 2d 70, 5 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1960) ; Faselli v. Southern Pac. Co.,
150 Cal. App. 2d 644, 310 P.2d 698 (1957) ; Jones v. Fat, 86 Cal. App. 2d 823, 195 P.2d 933
(1948).
"CAL. VEH. CODE § 40831.
"CAL. VEt CODE § 40831.
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